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Abstract 
In this paper, the identity theory of religion outline by sociologist Hans Mol in 
the 1970s is introduced and located among the various competing theories of the mid-
20th century. Using such comparisons, particularly with enigmatic sociological figures, 
it is argued that the original consensus that Mol represented yet another neo-
functionalist theory of religion is fallacious. Instead, it is suggested that his theoretical 
framework, whilst ambitious and broad, is something other than functionalism and 
avoids easy categorisation when viewed from a 21st-century perspective on the history 
of ideas. 
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Richard Nice ends his foreword to the English edition of Pierre 
Bourdieu’s Outline of a Theory of Practice with sobering words for ambitious 
social theoreticians: ‘The fact remains that a text which seeks to break out of a 
scheme of thought as deeply embedded as the opposition between 
subjectivism and objectivism is fated to be perceived through the categories 
which it seeks to transcend, and to appear contradictory or eclectic (except 
when forcibly reduced to one or the other alternative)’ (Nice, 1977: viii). 
                                                     
1 Portions of this material also published in: Powell, A. (2017), Hans Mol and the 
Sociology of Religion, Abingdon, Routledge. 
* Department of Theology and Religion, Durham University, Durham, United 
Kingdom. 
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Indeed, Nice’s observation rightly illuminates the hazardous road of 
scholarly advance, a path chosen by many but fruitfully navigated by relatively 
few. Arguably one of the latter, Bourdieu mined the shortcomings of previous 
perspectives and offered an original take on the relationship between an 
individual agent and his or her social structure. We will say more about 
Bourdieu’s system later, but our primary concern in the following pages is to 
suggest that Mol bravely embarked on a similar journey. With the publication 
of numerous essays and monographs in the 1960s and 70s, culminating in the 
composition of Identity and the Sacred (1976), Mol adumbrated a general 
sociological theory of religion which would prove difficult to categorise. In 
many ways, his theoretical contribution did seek ‘to break out of’ the existing 
dualism between ‘subjectivism and objectivism’ in the social sciences. More 
importantly, Mol proposed a frame of reference that sought to highlight social 
integration without being ‘functionalist’ and to recognise the potential 
tensions between modern social institutions without being a ‘conflict theory’. 
Of course, just as Nice’s prophetic words indicate, Mol’s work was assessed 
through the very lenses that he hoped to discard. 
Although the historical record denies us a clear consensus from the 
academic community, the most common (and typically dismissive) response to 
Mol’s identity theory was to denounce its ostensible functionalist 
reductionism. In other words, the assertions and aspirations of Mol’s 
theoretical contributions were ‘reduced to one…alternative.’ Mol (1979), of 
course, vehemently and explicitly denied such a description. Now, benefitting 
not only from retrospect but also from a new set of conceptual tools and 
sociological idioms, we are perhaps better equipped to investigate the place of 
Mol’s identity theory in the mid-20th century landscape of the sociology of 
religion. An undeniably fecund period for the social-scientific study of 
religion, the middle decades of the 20th century offered influential neo-
functionalist perspectives from figures such as Talcott Parsons and Peter 
Berger, but the era was also one of innovation and expanding disciplinary 
boundaries.  
Our paper begins by drafting a portrait of Mol’s theoretical agenda and 
intellectual ambitions before turning to an exploration of the web of 
contemporaneous theoretical notions cast over the field of sociology during 
the 20th century - in particular, the theories produced by a small number of 
enigmatic social scientists which eluded straightforward classification. 
Ultimately, we turn to Mol’s critics and their efforts to classify his offerings, 
illuminating an important question for the history of ideas as it pertains to the 
sociological study of religion: was the identity theory of Hans Mol simply 
another functionalist argument for the integrative role of religion in society or 
is it possible that such criticisms are the fallacious (though, perhaps inevitable) 
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consequences of inadequate classificatory schemes available to scholars of 
religion during the 1960s, 70s, and early 80s? 
1.  Identity and ambition 
Among the papers left behind at McMaster University, when Mol retired 
in 1987, were three pages of handwritten notes outlining a new book2. Squirrel 
in Quicksand: In Defence of Orthodoxy by a Christian Sociologist was never written 
nor published, but its title is both intriguing and instructive. According to the 
notes, the volume would begin with the telling of an anecdote concerning a 
heavy-machinery operator stuck in quicksand. There is little to indicate the 
intended meaning of this opening story, but an obvious link appears between 
the book’s subtitle and the succeeding outline. Organised into five chapters – 
‘The Self’, ‘The Family’, ‘The Community’, ‘The Nation’, and ‘The World’ – it 
appears that the study was meant to be a sociologically-informed analysis of 
the integrative potential of religious conservatism. Perhaps most important, at 
least for our purpose of illuminating this singular moment in the history of 
ideas, is Mol’s use of a dichotomy between fragmentation and integration in 
his plans for Squirrel in Quicksand. Indeed, Mol (1978a) increasingly interpreted 
the social world in the light of a dialectic between order and chaos, or 
‘wholeness and breakdown’. 
This intellectual orientation, arguably rooted in his experiences of 
religious functionality during imprisonment in World War II (Powell, 2015a: 
16, 19), informed and propelled Mol’s contributions to social theory and 
sociological explorations of religious identity. The 1976 publication of Identity 
and the Sacred, therefore, meant the dissemination of a new theory of religion in 
which identity was central and the tension between stability and differentiation 
fundamental. Mol asserted that identity is ‘the stable niche that man occupies 
in a potentially chaotic environment which he is therefore prepared vigorously 
to defend’ and, somewhat glibly, defined religion as ‘the sacralisation of 
identity’ (1976: 1, 65). Attempting to avoid the pitfalls of both substantive and 
functional definitions of religion, Mol suggested that religion is neither a set of 
beliefs nor a socio-cultural force but an action. In this way, he was able to turn 
the analytical lens on the individual’s drive for existential balance, bringing 
into focus the social developments and behavioural outcomes stemming from 
one’s negotiation with life. Interminably unnerved due to an existence 
                                                     
2 I am indebted to the William Ready Division of Archives and Research Collections 
of the McMaster University Libraries for dutifully and generously supplying me with 
copies of hundreds of pages of Mol’s papers. In this particular case, I am pleased to 
possess Mol’s notes for this unrealised study.  
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characterised by a stability/adaptability dialectic, humans, Mol argued, are 
necessarily involved in identity construction. This is true because, for Mol, 
identity is associated with stability and order. Therefore, humanity’s 
predilection for religiosity is helpfully understood as a predisposition to 
making sacred that which provides a sense of identity in the face of potential 
disorder. Ultimately, religion is understood as that sacralising process. 
These assertions, however, were offered in the 1970s – a time of deep 
cultural questioning in many western societies and a period of distinctive 
productiveness in the social-scientific study of religion. Peter Berger and 
Thomas Luckmann had presented their blend of phenomenology and the 
sociology of knowledge ten years prior (1967), and the French post-
modernists were emerging as outstanding social theorists3. Such a context 
meant that new theoretical contributions needed not only to blend careful 
nuance with the responsible attribution of ideas to one’s intellectual 
benefactors but also to reckon with an ever-increasing body of religious data. 
Consequently, Mol often acknowledged the great challenge of formulating a 
general theory of religion (1976; 1979). However, awareness does not mean 
abrogation, and his identity theory of religion dominated Mol’s writings from 
1976 until his retirement. 
Indeed, his was an ambitious agenda, an observation which he admitted 
readily (Mol, 1979). The new theory was not only ostensibly capable of 
explaining universal religion but was also intended as an integration of, and 
corrective for, the multifaceted approaches and findings of the social and 
natural sciences with regards to animal behaviour and sociality. This breadth 
and ambition is patently clear in his many essays which range from evolution 
to medieval history and are interpreted in the light of ethology, behavioural 
psychology, and philosophy (Powell, 2017). Yet, in this sense, these works 
simply represent the complete oeuvre, a career’s corpus dedicated to 
introducing and to sustaining the concept of identity within discussions of 
religion’s place in the modern world. Similar notions existed, of course; Orin 
Klapp and Robert Bellah both – contemporaneously – posited identity as an 
important concept for social science (Klapp, 1969; Bellah, 1965). 
However, the sociology of religion had largely ignored non-rational 
components of religion from its first inception, affording pride of place to the 
more rationalistic notion of meaning-making. In many ways, Mol broke vital 
ground by including identity as an analytical tool useful for elucidating often-
overlooked elements of religion and religiosity – namely, the varieties of 
emotional commitment and ritual reinforcement experienced by practitioners. 
                                                     
3 It is worth noting that the inaugural volume of Michel Foucault’s History of Sexuality 
was also published in 1976, the same year as Mol’s Identity and the Sacred. 
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Accordingly, this meant a sociological theory uniquely attuned to subjective 
experience for, as Douglas Davies states, ‘identity…roots meaning in the 
individual’ (1984: 7). Although Mol (1976) offered a definition/discussion of 
collective identity and conspicuously relied on religious concepts rooted in the 
institutionalised churches of the West, his emphasis – or, in our estimation, his 
most original contribution – was often his analysis of sacralisation at the 
personal level. This even led one of his critics to claim that ‘part of religious 
reality is missing from Mol’s argument’: the ‘community’ (Kollar, 1979: 333). 
Of course, it would be difficult to substantiate Kollar’s assertion – that 
Mol’s theory is devoid of content related to the collective – with regards to 
Identity and the Sacred and utterly disingenuous with regards to the rest of his 
publications. Mol was a skilful analyst of society with considerable training in 
the matter. His astute recognition of the import of individual identity for the 
academic study of religion was not a blinder but a filter, shaping and 
determining his object of scrutiny, yes, but also beneficially guiding the social 
sciences into the facets of 20th-century life where religion was a meaningful, 
lived reality. Just as Evans-Pritchard had done for anthropology – indicating 
that religion was about ‘faith and sentiment’ rather than ‘experiment and 
reasoning’ – so Mol did for the sociology of religion (Evans-Pritchard, 1965). 
His process of sacralisation was composed of four ‘mechanisms’: 
objectification, ritual, myth, and commitment. In defining the last of the four, 
however, Mol diverged from his contemporaries (Stark, Glock, 1968; Stark, 
Bainbridge, 1987); religious commitment was not simply measurable religious 
participation but was understood to be ‘emotional attachment’ (Mol, 1976: 
11). In fact, Mol asserted that ‘faith is often the theological synonym for what 
is here called commitment’ (original emphasis) (1976: 221). Incorporating 
religious sentiment and considering individual identity, however, came at a 
cost. As we will show in our later discussion of Mol’s critics and their claims, 
the price paid for this unusual investigative angle was the measurability of its 
variables. 
It should be noted, though, that this approach was partially a function of 
Mol’s enduring effort to synthesise the many methods and theories vying for 
consideration and application at the time. What is more, taking the individual 
as primary presaged many things to come for both the humanities and the 
social sciences. Before ‘the subjective turn’ of post-structuralism, and prior to 
the prevalence of a methodological dichotomy splitting emic and etic analyses, 
Mol envisaged a rigorous, sociologically-informed approach to studying 
religious communities and their members which would do justice to the 
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human longing for a harmonious existence without stumbling down the well-
worn path of phenomenological interpretation4. 
2.  Sympathetic scholarship 
Thus, in Meaning and Place, Mol identified his own methodological 
orientation as ‘sympathetic scholarship’: ‘In other words, one can adopt the 
view that existence is too narrowly conceived when the 
scientific/analytic/differentiation mode prevails. Leaving room for the 
religious/synthetic/integration mode extends the horizons. Both compensate 
for the weaknesses of each other’ (1983: 67). 
This ‘sympathetic’ approach was, in part, a reaction to the early 
disciplinary rift between the ostensibly cold reductionism of sociology and the 
equally ostensive empathy of ethnography and participant observation (Mol 
1983). Although this sort of inclusivity – embracing both the ‘analytic’ and the 
‘synthetic’ – engendered few friendships among fellow sociologists, in the end 
Mol was at least successful in offering a sociological interpretation of religion 
palatable for some religious believers. Indeed, one review essay in 1977 
concluded that Identity and the Sacred ‘is gratifying in its scholarship and 
refreshing in its approach’: ‘Here is a social scientist who takes theological 
statements and religious expressions with more than the usual seriousness’ 
(Largo, 1977: 360). This desire to accommodate religious faith in his social-
scientific analysis, however, was not simply a countervailing move against dry 
rationality but was also one more important item on Mol’s list of aspirations. 
By conceiving of religion as a sort of social-psychological process in which 
identities are formed and cloaked in sacred significance, he had boldly melded 
the inferences of ethologists, social scientists, and philosophers. To welcome, 
and at times even to explicate, theological and faith-based assumptions was 
simply to add more chairs around an already teeming table.  
Yet, constructing a general theory is a daunting task, correlating massive 
bodies of data with an equally capacious frame of reference. Beyond that, the 
endeavour is unavoidably plagued by scepticism from others, as the proffering 
of a new comprehensive theory implies evident weaknesses in existing 
frameworks. Even so, Mol’s ambition remained ever formidable, and it was 
inextricably linked to his firm grasp on the social weight of religious meaning 
                                                     
4 Accordingly, his awareness of the complex relationship orienting the individual to 
his or her social world led Mol to a dubious embrace of the popular secularization 
thesis in the 1960s. Already in 1965, well before such statements became common, 
Mol argued that speaking ‘about the secularization process in modern society as 
though it is a pervasive force is an over-simplification’ (1965: 45). 
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and self-definition. That being said, Mol was not entirely alone in composing a 
general social theory and combining disciplinary perspectives to do so – or 
even in utilising a dialectic as the building block of such an intellectual 
contribution. 
3.  Enigmas, general theories, and contemporaries 
In fact, the mid-20th century brought with it a number of influential social 
theorists who not only shared a concern for the place of the individual in 
society but who also expressed their ideas in strikingly original ways. Some of 
Mol’s contemporaries, such as Harold Fallding, Louis Schneider, and Roland 
Robertson sought to analyse the social foundations of religion by expanding 
the functionalist paradigm established by Durkheim5. Others, however, 
maintained a purview wide enough to encompass more social phenomena 
than just religion, striving to move beyond the classic theories of the social 
sciences and pave the way for novel approaches.  
One of the latter, Robert Merton, served as Mol’s teacher and supervisor 
during his doctoral research at Columbia University. Influenced by the 
functionalism of his friend Talcott Parsons, but also championing what he 
called ‘middle-range theories’ in which social scientists were encouraged to 
aim for empirically-supported theories instead of large-scale abstraction 
(Merton, 1968), Merton’s considerable contributions to the field of sociology 
almost certainly shaped Mol’s balance of empiricism and theorising. 
Furthermore, one should note that Mol’s work betrays a number of 
presuppositions which were undoubtedly inherited from his intellectual 
forebears: humanity possesses an innate drive for order, religion offers an 
interpretation of reality with the potential to eradicate disorder, and too much 
focus on social structures – over and above individual agents – could distort 
the conclusions of social theorists. Emboldened by his mentors, and resting in 
the plausibility surrounding such new sociological understandings of the 
world, Mol embarked on the development of a general theory which would 
                                                     
5 Fallding published his The Sociology of Religion (1974), in which he discusses the 
concept of religious identity as a tool for understanding modern religion, just two 
years prior to the publication of Mol’s Identity and the Sacred. Four years before 
Fallding’s book appeared, Schneider followed his influential sociology reader Religion, 
Culture, and Society (1964) with his most forthright endorsement of functionalism, 
Sociological Approach to Religion (1970). Yet, Schneider’s theoretical contribution was 
eclipsed somewhat by the scope and ambition of Robertson’s The Sociological 
Interpretation of Religion the same year. According to one reviewer, in fact, Robertson’s 
work shared certain defining traits with Mol’s: force, novelty, and thoroughness 
(Coleman, 1978). 
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unashamedly aim higher than Merton’s middle-range whilst also placing a 
notion of balance at the nucleus of religious life. This balance between order 
and disorder, as well as between structure and agency, was expressed and 
defended as a ‘dialectic’, an interdependent relationship in which two 
opposites are mutually sustained by their antagonism. 
4.  Dialectics 
Largely borrowed from Hegel’s philosophy and Karl Barth’s early 20th-
century theology, the notion of dialectics had already been put to use in the 
sociology of religion before Mol. In The Sociological Interpretation of Religion, 
Roland Robertson highlighted the contingency existing between social 
structure and culture, describing a dialectical system in which religious culture 
consists of beliefs and practices which, nevertheless, require a social structure 
for their expression (1970). Although this was, in many ways, a further 
elaboration of the discipline’s earlier postulation of a sacred/profane 
dichotomy, Robertson’s articulation placed greater emphasis on the manner 
by which culture shapes social groups and vice versa. Even more importantly, 
Robertson’s study was a harbinger of slightly later works such as Mol’s which, 
even if only implicitly, tended to give credit to the philosophical/theological 
origins of such dialectics. 
After the two world wars, western religionists as well as intellectuals in 
related fields like philosophy, theology, and the social sciences sought effective 
means for comprehending their newly dishevelled world. From Hasidic 
immigrants in New York who embraced a staunch orthodoxy because their 
experiences in Eastern Europe precluded any acceptance of human progress 
to the ‘death of God’ theologians who saw no relevance for the modern world 
in the orthodox notion of transcendence, the dominant pursuit became 
stability and meaningful identity in the face of dramatic tragedy and 
undeniable change. Those cultural anxieties also engendered the new social-
scientific theories with which we are concerned, and the adoption of the 
philosophical category ‘dialectic’ by sociologists is a remarkable example of 
that reality.  
In the introduction to Identity and the Sacred, Mol (1976) briefly mentions 
his background in theology, with its attendant studies of Karl Barth. Although 
he does not explicitly confirm any indebtedness to his theological training for 
his later sociological notion of dialectics, it strains one very little to suggest 
such a connection. Barth rose to prominence as one of, if not the, most 
important theologians of the 20th century after formulating a ‘dialectical 
theology’ which emphasised the various dualities and paradoxes in Christian 
concepts of the divine, such as grace and justice (1919). Mol was first attracted 
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to theology through Barth’s writings, and it is noteworthy that Mol 
subsequently developed an interest in the relationship of religion and society 
whilst studying under another dialectical thinker, Reinhold Niebuhr, at Union 
Theological Seminary (Powell, 2015). Yet, Mol’s dialectic ultimately had little 
in common with Barth’s dualistic divine truths. As we have seen, Mol saw a 
basic dichotomy between sameness and change, or stability and 
differentiation, at the heart of the natural and social sciences. Thus, his 
thoughts were more in accord with fellow sociologist Peter Berger’s (1973) 
assertion that the sacred is opposed by chaos. 
In that sociological sphere, the Hegelian formula – thesis, antithesis, 
resolution – was also influential. For example, just as Mol allowed Barth to 
inform his identity theory, so Claude Lévi-Strauss adapted Hegel for his 
structural analyses of myth: ‘Mythical thought always progresses from the 
awareness of oppositions toward their resolution’ (1972: 224). In Lévi-Strauss’ 
system, Mol found contemporary affirmation; myth existed in a dialectical 
relationship with empirical reality, integrating and mending the incongruous 
objectivities of human experience. Likewise, those lived realities were given 
expression and comprehension through mythical thought. It was, as Mol 
(1976) eagerly argued, as though the two binary opposites (viz., empirical 
reality and mythical intimation) existed in a perpetual state of conflict and 
complementarity. For Mol, however, this dynamic existed more broadly in 
nature and in society. The struggle for balance between two opposed forces 
was found at the macro level, well beyond specific cultural products like 
myths. His dialectic, pitting order against chaos and stability against 
adaptation, formed the very basis of evolution as much as it shaped the social 
structures of human civilisations. 
5.  Enigmas 
Although Mol’s passionate postulation of a general theory capable of 
describing and elucidating these very foundations of human existence – owing 
something to neo-orthodox Christian theology, nonetheless – may have 
betrayed an overly ambitious and inherently untenable project, it also placed 
him in the company of other somewhat enigmatic intellectuals. We have noted 
the influence of Merton and the similarities with Fallding, Berger, et al. Yet, 
the unexpected way in which Mol exemplified interdisciplinarity and 
macrosocial scope in his theoretical musings meant that he eluded easy 
classification. Applying psychological and ethological concepts – identity and 
territoriality, respectively – was only marginally unique in the sociology of 
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religion6; think of Durkheim’s much earlier discussion of the geographical 
component of totemism for Australian aborigines. However, combining those 
with philosophical systems and a recurring argument for the sociological 
complexity of conservative religious belief so that the result is both an 
acknowledgement of the harmonising potential of religious membership and 
an endorsement of ‘independent identity’ in the face of rapid change was 
arguably quite original (Mol, 1976)7. 
With the retrospection available to us in the 21st century, it is rather 
unremarkable that a social theorist would point to the significance of the 
individual or include a non-rational, affective mechanism (viz., commitment) 
in his or her theoretical framework. The anthropology of religion, for instance, 
had rapidly severed ties with its 19th-century roots in social Darwinism and 
even moved beyond phenomenology to embrace a methodology built on the 
solemnity, and nuance, of personal experience. It was not long, of course, 
before post-structuralism gripped the social-scientific baton and sprinted 
farther down the same track. The line between subject and object, we now 
grant, is awfully faded. 
However, Mol, and those with whom we will argue he had the most in 
common, appears to have had little interest in testing the waters of the 
postmodern stream. Among his sociological influences were the fathers of the 
field, Weber and Durkheim, as well as Merton and Parsons as we have noted. 
Structural-Functionalism constituted a predominant force and a valid 
analytical orientation for Mol and most of his peers emerging from Columbia 
University in the 1950s. We show below that, although he actively sought to 
unburden himself of the functionalist indictment as his career progressed, 
Mol’s critics remained a nearly united front in hurling that very accusation at 
his identity theory. Even so, our contention is that Mol offered (and perhaps 
still does) an unclassifiable perspective closer to the thoughts of disparate 
international figures such as Erving Goffman, Jacques Ellul, Pierre Bourdieu, 
and Alberto Melucci than to either Durkheim or Foucault. 
 
                                                     
6 Beyond the field of sociology, of course, the famous scientist (and Mol’s 
contemporary) E. O. Wilson combined sociology with biology to form ‘the new 
synthesis’ of sociobiology (1975). 
7 In fact, Mol published numerous studies intended to espouse the social benefits of 
orthodoxy. These include his doctoral thesis, later published as The Breaking of 
Traditions (1968). What is more, Mol corresponded with the French social scientist and 
philosopher Jacques Ellul, telling Ellul in 1981 that students at McMaster are required 
to read Ellul’s writings for their ‘analysis of the sociological sophistication of 
theological orthodoxy’ (from personal letter now in this author’s possession). 
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5.1 Erving Goffman and the mystified self 
In the case of Goffman, one of the most widely cited social scientists of 
the 20th century, eluding easy classification came more as a function of an 
unsystematic approach to social theorising than as a result of ambitious, 
reductive generalising. As Bernard Meltzer argues, ‘We find in [Goffman’s] 
work no explicit theory, but a plausible and loosely organised frame of 
reference; little interest in explanatory schemes, but masterful descriptive 
analysis; virtually no accumulated evidence, but illuminating allusions, 
impressions, anecdotes, and illustrations; few formulations of empirically 
testable propositions, but innumerable provocative insights’ (Meltzer, Petras, 
Reynolds, 1975: 70). 
In this way, Goffman’s notions of the ‘symbolic interactions’ performed 
by ‘acting’ humans as they encounter one another in various contexts present 
themselves as a sort of counterpoint to Mol’s concise explanatory model, a 
general theory of religion which purports to explain a great deal of evidence 
whilst dedicating comparatively little time to descriptive analysis. Where 
Goffman is eager to magnify the tacit cues and manoeuvres of human 
interface so that his audience can see that which was already there, Mol is keen 
to unveil the social, cultural, and biological drives that manifest as a unified 
predilection for stable meaning in the face of ever-present disruption – 
Goffman illuminates; Mol reveals. 
This difference in method and approach corresponds with a difference in 
content and conclusion. Goffman’s ‘dramaturgical’ system is built on the 
concept of social ‘performance’ as ‘all the activity of a given participant on a 
given occasion which serves to influence in any way any of the other 
participants’ (1959: 15). As actors participate in the theatre of the everyday, 
they are significantly exercised by the disparity between their persona in each 
scene and their backstage self. In expounding his theoretical scheme, 
Goffman (1959) seems convinced that individuals’ observable behaviours, 
then, are largely born of the overwhelming desire to control such 
performances. Mol, however, is more obviously beholden to the roots of the 
sociology of religion which tend to understand the human experience as a 
projection of underlying individual and group needs – namely, a deep yearning 
for meaning. Thus, it is not surprising that Mol criticises Goffman’s 
‘performing self’ as being overly concerned with the facade-constructing 
aspect of the individual instead of the authentic struggle for a clearly 
demarcated niche of stability (Mol, 1976). The latter, Mol argues, fits the 
available religious data more closely by accounting for the way in which 
religious systems – their thought-forms and ritualised activities – are matched 
to human existential concerns. In other words, whilst it may be the case that 
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individuals expend great effort to control the manner in which they are 
perceived by others, such an observation fails to offer a compelling 
justification for the genesis and sustained viability of a socio-cultural 
institution as significant as religion. Mol, of course, understands that 
Goffman’s agenda is not to explain the phenomenon of religion but to 
describe the minutiae of human encounters. Even so, for Mol it is ‘identity’ 
instead of ‘performance’ that integrates and elucidates the social lives of 
humans. 
Limiting our discussion to the disagreements between these theorists, 
however, would be misleading and unconstructive. Indeed, we name Goffman 
alongside Mol not only because of the uniqueness of the two but also because 
of their similar ideas. For instance, long before Mol expressed the important 
connections between religious commitment as ‘an anchoring of the emotions 
in a salient system of meaning’ and ritualized behaviour (Mol, 1976: 216), 
Goffman noted that emotion is a ‘move in a ritual game’ which complements 
the rational element of social interactions (Smith, 2006: 11, 97). Perhaps more 
importantly, Goffman preceded Mol in recognising the near sacrality of 
individual identity. In The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, he discusses the 
‘mystification’ of the actor in relation to his or her audience as a highly-
manipulated field of meaning surrounding the individual which enables him or 
her to navigate social life successfully whilst preserving the most essential and 
continuous aspects of the self by ensuring that the latter remain out of the 
audience’s reach (Goffman, 1959). This closely resembles Mol’s assertions 
concerning ‘sacralization’, the process by which stability is fortified through 
the erection of a sacred sphere around particularly effective foci of identity. 
For both, the sacrosanct quality of personal identity receives pride of place 
due to the potential for ‘identity depletion’; in particular social performances, 
as in a differentiating society generally, the inescapable presence of 
destabilising change means that safeguards are sought to eliminate or minimise 
the loss of self8. 
Here, we encounter the unexpected harmony between these two 
theoreticians and ultimately recognise the reason for the awkwardness in 20th-
century attempts to label their efforts. One cannot expect or presuppose 
determinism or conflict, social hegemony or cultural revolution when human 
identity is indissolubly linked to, and in a dialectical relationship with, social 
                                                     
8 We use ‘identity depletion’ in the sense outlined by Douglas Davies, as the negative 
effects on identity sometimes engendered by certain socio-cultural phenomena such as 
excessive individualism and a lack of reciprocity. See Douglas J. D. (2011), Emotion, 
Identity, and Religion: Hope, Reciprocity, and Otherness, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 
68. 
Adam J. Powell 
Functionalism or Fallacy: Re-locating Hans Mol’s Identity Theory 
75 
structure and changing contexts. Thus, the differences in purview and angle of 
approach between Goffman and Mol do not preclude agreement on a number 
of sociological issues and, similarly, do not prevent us from highlighting their 
comparably idiosyncratic theoretical contributions. 
5.2 Jacques Ellul and the erosion of self 
Perhaps it is to be expected, then, that the similarities between Mol and 
Ellul likewise have at least as much to do with being enigmatic generally as 
they do with possessing analogous views – viz., a perpetual social oscillation in 
which the individual struggles to locate stability somewhere between the poles 
of pure individuality on the one hand and unrestrained differentiation (or 
technological efficiency, for Ellul) on the other. It is instructive, for instance, 
that Mol includes Ellul in a chapter on identity’s ‘kindred concepts’, 
specifically positioning Ellul within a discussion of religion’s social significance 
and just prior to concluding that ‘there is no escape from the relevance of 
independent identity’ (Mol, 1976: 77-78). For Mol and his French counterpart, 
as well as for Melucci as we will see, sovereign independence is the 
compensator (or, at least, consequence) for rapid societal change. That which 
Mol takes to be stability in the face of forced adaptation, Ellul sees as critical 
thinking and individualism succumbing to the effects of propaganda and mass 
technology (Ellul, 1965). Each theorist locates the individual or group 
opposite society or socio-political movement. Mol’s manner of doing so is 
consumed by his belief in the unrelenting nature of social differentiation: 
identity is in a dialectical relationship with change. In contrast, Ellul (2004) 
prefers to focus on one (for him, regrettable) hallmark of modern, 
differentiated society: ‘technique’. ‘Technique’ refers to the machinations and 
methods engendered by, and serving, society’s devotion to efficiency. As 
efficiency increases it becomes both the end and the means, ultimately 
demanding a hospitable environment in which ‘technique’ is used for its own 
interminable development (Ellul, 2004). This notion leads Ellul (2004) to a 
scathing evaluation of technological innovation as the central challenge to a 
healthy sense of self; technique ‘suppresses’ both the subject and his or her 
sense of meaning9. 
Thus, by suggesting that humans exist in a give-and-take relationship with 
social realities such as technology, economics, and scientism, Ellul adopts a 
                                                     
9 Ellul’s most well-known publication on ‘technique’ is undoubtedly The Technological 
Society. However, we have chosen to reference a later work in which Ellul attempts an 
exhaustive summary of his theoretical contributions from the full period of his career. 
It is in the latter (Perspectives on Our Age) that the theoretician seems most clear and 
systematic with his presentation. 
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dialectical framework which is remarkably akin to Mol’s theory of identity. 
The modern self faces potential erosion by the collective adoration of 
efficiency qua efficiency. This lived reality, however, is of little surprise: 
‘Ultimately, every living organism has a certain number of forces working to 
preserve and renew it and a certain number working to destroy it. Hence, 
there are successive equilibriums between the forces of life and the forces of 
death. And the person or the organism evolves accordingly’ (Ellul, 2004: 6). 
In the struggle for existence, therefore, humans must adapt to survive – 
this imperative is as true for a microorganism robbed of a suitable habitat as it 
is for an individual robbed of purpose. Turning to Mol, we observe further 
agreement not only in the perceived desirability of social adaptation but also in 
the very language itself: ‘To us, the dialectic between differentiation and 
identity (integration) consists of both attraction and repulsion, mutual need and 
basic conflict...there is much give and take. Viable religious orientations and 
organisations develop sophisticated mechanisms to deal with change’ (original 
emphasis) (Mol, 1976: 21). 
It is important to note that both Mol and Ellul embrace such an 
evolutionary perspective and, somewhat unexpectedly, both are indebted to 
Barth (not Hegel) for their dialectical thinking. 
This fact, that both Mol and Ellul owe their basic theoretical foundations 
to a prominent Christian theologian, goes some way toward explaining (or at 
least establishing) their unique positions in the arena of social theory. In a 
manner which has significantly diminished in frequency and acceptance over 
the past few decades, Ellul managed to present himself to academia as an 
equally competent sociologist, philosopher, and theologian. In the succinct 
words of John Coleman, ‘Ellul is a bit hard to type, academically’ (2011: 44). 
As an incisive commentator on overlooked socio-cultural phenomena, Ellul’s 
name finds a rightful place alongside Goffman’s. As the purveyor of a 
dialectical social theory in which the self is threatened by those observed 
socio-cultural movements, he rests comfortably beside Mol. Nevertheless, 
Ellul’s notion that modernity has regrettably created a cult of technology 
which now corrodes and corrupts personal meaning necessitates that we look 
elsewhere for a counterpart to the sort of harmonising, and decidedly more 
hopeful, balance intimated by Mol’s identity theory. 
5.3 Pierre Bourdieu: self and structure 
There is an apparent dourness found in the ideas of both Goffman and 
Ellul – the conceptualisations of a social world in which nothing escapes 
severe subjective control and all innocence is lost – which is at least partially a 
consequence of the way in which they conceive of the self in relation to 
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society. For both, this relationship is a zero-sum game; society or its structures 
are only permitted power and influence at the expense of the power and 
influence of the individual psyche or sense of personal meaning. Thus, 
Goffman must posit the ‘mystification of the self’ as a process of self-defence, 
and Ellul must call for the reconsideration of technological ‘advancement’. 
For Mol, however, the ever-present threat to identity (personal and 
collective) is a necessary component of the preservation of that same sense of 
belonging. In other words, the dialectic entails social stability not only being 
set against social change but also incorporating that change, neutralising the 
threat through strategic degrees of flexibility. Although Ellul also highlights 
the need for adaptation – as we have seen – Mol’s emphasis diverges from his 
contemporaries by underscoring the salutary effect of socially antagonistic 
forces. Consequently, balance emerges as the ideal; too much order amounts 
to fatal rigidity, just as too much differentiation leads to the dissolution of 
meaningful identity (Mol, 1976). 
In the years after the publication of Mol’s theory, proposing a balance 
between the individual agent and his or her social environment became more 
common. We should note, for example, that the mid-1980s witnessed 
Anthony Giddens’ (1986) presentation of ‘structuration theory’ in which the 
focus is on the life-world as a combination of external social structures and the 
‘structures’ found within the thoughts and behaviours of subjects. Later, 
Melucci (1996) underscored the centrality of identity in his observation that 
sociological studies were beginning to understand the interplay between 
individuals and mass societal apparatuses. Four years before Mol’s Identity and 
the Sacred appeared and more than 15 years prior to Giddens’ or Melucci’s 
contributions, however, the French sociologist/anthropologist Pierre 
Bourdieu outlined a theory in which a balance between agency and structure 
(or, ‘field’ in Bourdieu’s preferred terminology) was afforded primacy. Like 
Mol and others, Bourdieu explicitly claimed to offer a dialectic, this time as a 
third option between mechanical determinism and unrestricted freedom10. 
It could reasonably be argued that the comparative success of Bourdieu’s 
theory is a function of his ability and willingness to name the balance he was 
championing. Unlike Mol, who unashamedly placed the burden on his 
audience to sort out the implications of a system in which ‘identity’ is both 
one half of the dialectic and its ideal solution, Bourdieu offered a middle road: 
‘habitus’. As the intermingling of human agency and ever-generative social 
                                                     
10 In at least one place, Bourdieu referred to this as ‘the dialectic of objectification and 
incorporation’ (1995: 88). In all cases, he seems to intend a perspective that is 
somewhere between cold rational evaluation on the one hand (agency) and pre-
determined passive conformity (structural determinism) on the other hand. 
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influences, habitus is the living embodiment of humanity’s unavoidably social 
experience: ‘...the habitus is an endless capacity to engender products – 
thoughts, perceptions, expressions, actions – whose limits are set by the 
historically and socially situated conditions of its productions...’ (Bourdieu, 
1995: 95). This formulation, then, directs the analyst’s gaze beyond the tension 
of the dialectic where it is encouraged to alight on the domain of habitus. 
There, Bourdieu asserts, one will find the active complexity of social living in 
which the incessant production and reproduction of socio-cultural systems 
contacts the equally interminable constructions of the human agent.  
From this perspective, the arena of lived experience is not Goffman’s 
person-to-person or actor-to-audience interaction, nor is it Ellul’s zero-sum 
relationship between meaningful individualism and deleterious societal trends. 
Instead, embodied reality is there at the nexus of agentive ingenuity and socio-
cultural constraint. In a sense, then, Bourdieu’s habitus does for social analysis 
generally what Mol’s definition of religion as ‘the sacralisation of identity’ 
(1976: 1) does for the sociology of religion in particular; both concepts shed 
light on the manner by which individuals interpret, sustain, and create their 
‘realities’ (thoughts, perceptions, belief systems, etc.) by integrating external 
social forces with personal drives. Those external forces, however, are for 
Bourdieu frequently understood as socio-cultural limits. Structures contribute 
to habitus by restricting the agency of the person, just as the person 
contributes an otherwise unbounded will. 
5.4 Alberto Melucci and the self at play 
Likewise, the theoretical works of Italian sociologist Albert Melucci 
emphasise the personal negotiation with social limits, connecting that process 
to an ongoing struggle for identity. In his The Playing Self11, Melucci (1996) 
identifies a number of pernicious, or at least paradoxical, elements in the 
modern globalising world – highlighting, for example, the irony in our ever-
increasing quantities of information and technology which simultaneously 
establish greater capacities for controlling our lives as well as the necessity of 
doing so if we hope to retain meaning in the endlessly changing societies we 
have created. Indeed, he seems to echo aspects of Ellul in asserting that the 
technological world is one devoid of ‘the language of wonder’ (Melucci, 1996: 
142). Furthermore, his diagnosis of the ills facing one’s struggle for identity, as 
well as his desire to equate identity with ‘fixed anchor points’ (Melucci, 1996: 
2), places Melucci squarely alongside Mol: ‘It is above all in situations of crisis 
                                                     
11 First published in Italian as Il gioco dell’io: Il cambiamento di se in una societa globale, 
Milano, Feltrinelli, (1991). 
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that our identity and its weaknesses are revealed – as for instance when we are 
subjected to contradictory expectations, or when we lose our traditional bonds 
of belonging, when we join a new system of norms. These conflicts constitute 
a severe test for our identity, and they may also damage it…The most serious 
crises may provoke a breakdown, a fragmentation of the self, or a breach of its 
confines’ (Melucci, 1996: 30). 
In this formulation, then, identity is something opposed by changing 
circumstances, the implication being that identity is bound up with a notion of 
stability or continuity. Mol agrees, of course; a sense of stable order may be 
stretched too far by the forces of differentiation. However, Melucci also 
reaches conclusions similar to, but distinguishable from12, Bourdieu with 
regards to the self and its ‘confines’. Where Bourdieu posits habitus as the 
world-establishing symbiosis of exogenous constraints on the person, Melucci 
blends his background in psychology with his sociological analysis to suggest 
that ‘pathology’ is found where either those boundaries are penetrated or 
made inescapably ‘rigid’ (1996). This is a sort of negative of Bourdieu’s 
habitus, and emphasis is accordingly more on personal psychological 
wellbeing and less on the construction of our social Lebenswelten. 
Yet, in Melucci’s writings, there is the offer of a solution to the dilemma 
facing individuals as they ‘search for a safe haven for the self’ (1996: 2), a 
challenge which we see at the heart of Mol’s dialectic. The resolution is found 
in Melucci’s notion of ‘play’, particularly as it relates to his concept of 
‘identisation’. The former is a kind of freedom of flexibility combined with 
existential creativity; the individual recognises the strains of modern life and 
extends to his or herself an offer of liberty: ‘Our self may learn to play if we 
allow ourselves to create, to go beyond the limit and open up to the possible 
still without losing our boundaries’ (Melucci, 1996: 139). This process of 
identity negotiation in the midst of external influences is then called 
identisation, a term meant to capture the active processual character of 
identity conservation (Melucci, 1996: 31). If Mol’s sacralisation is the ongoing 
act of creating religion around identity, identisation is the interminable activity 
of constructing identity in the first place. To be sure, Melucci’s theory relies 
more heavily on reflexive self-awareness, skirting forthright notions of 
emotional impulse or unconscious fluidities at work in the affinities between 
self and identity source. Of course, this is likely a consequence of Melucci’s 
                                                     
12 We should note, for instance, that Melucci is much more comfortable with the idea 
of identity as, in part, an empowered sense of autonomy and ‘pure awareness’ of the 
self (1996). This is somewhat at odds with Bourdieu (and Mol) who frequently 
underscores the regulative check on agentive power represented by social ‘fields’. 
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professional and intellectual blend of psychology and sociology, a trait that 
underpins the originality of his ideas and justifies his inclusion in our study. 
It is, of course, also important to note the striking agreement between 
Melucci’s hopeful assessment of the ‘playing’ self which attains a certain 
freedom of movement and thus ‘the capacity to change form…while still 
continuing to be the same person (original emphasis)’ and Mol’s conclusion: 
‘…too much stability, and too much change, can wreck a system. The dialectic 
as such seems to be a prerequisite for the viability and survival of personal, 
group, or social identity’ (1976: 262). Indeed, despite their differing analytical 
directives, the theoretical works of Mol, Bourdieu, and Melucci all embrace a 
sort of dialectical framework and do so – in part – as a means of mediating the 
opposition between theories of structure and theories of agency. In the mid-
to-late-20th century this was a daunting task, but ultimately these sociologists 
offered sophisticated scholarly correctives. Indeed, our own focus on 
dialectical thought and its connections to the rather novel concepts of several 
20th-century social scientists is largely due to a conviction that there is a sort of 
‘virtue of the mean’ at work in these systems. With regards to Mol’s theory, 
for instance, it does seem that many religious communities persevere when 
they are able to put external influences to work, integrating outside threats 
into their stability-reinforcing schemas (ritual lives, thought-forms, doctrines, 
etc.). 
That being said, the dialectic is perhaps useful because – when applied in 
this manner – it essentially argues that all elements of society (the ‘give’ and 
the ‘take’) potentially benefit that society. In this way, it is both incisive and 
somewhat circular. Accordingly, those dialectic-based general theories 
propagated by scholars such as Robertson, Ellul, Bourdieu, and Mol tend to 
encompass all and, therefore, purport to explain all. Their utility is arguably 
grounded in the human desire to reduce complexities into intelligible systems 
as much as it is grounded in any set of observable social patterns. Although 
dialectics rightly suggest that countervailing forces sharpen one another 
through that very struggle, they sometimes fall short in explicating the 
multifarious products of those oscillations. With that in mind, it is important 
to recognise that Mol departs from most of the aforementioned 
contemporaries by limiting his general theory to discussions of religion and 
exerting great effort in the hopes of elucidating the process by which striking a 
balance between stability and change also means abetting the future resilience 
of that religious community13. Of course, establishing a link between 
                                                     
13 For an application of this aspect of Mol’s theory to two specific religious 
communities, see: Powell, A. (2015), Irenaeus, Joseph Smith, and God-making Heresy, 
Madison, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press. 
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adaptability and a religious group’s future viability opens the door for Mol’s 
critics to denounce his ideas as ever so much functionalism. 
6.  Critics and classification 
We end our assessment, then, by turning to those claims of functionalism 
as well as a number of important appraisals of Mol’s thought from both his 
critics and us. Indeed, our analysis cannot ignore that in the majority of his 
writings, Mol attempts very broad application of a theoretical approach based 
on an equally broad synthesis of mid-20th-century discoveries from a 
multitude of disciplines. This is a risky endeavour – one in which description 
is easily conflated with explanation, observation with conceptualisation. For 
example, Mol claims to be developing operational definitions of ‘identity’ and 
‘religion’, for instance, yet essentially offers descriptive analyses which are not 
easily testable. This sort of shortcoming plagues many social-scientific 
theories, and Mol’s was no different.  
The theory’s great scope, however, meant that other criticisms arose as 
well, and Robert Towler’s is particularly stringent. Discussing Identity and the 
Sacred, Towler says of Mol, ‘In seeking to advance his own thesis he does 
justice to none of the writers he discusses’ (1979: 1034). In other words, the 
breadth of Mol’s study is so comprehensive as to inhibit (if not entirely 
preclude) appropriate and satisfactory engagement with the works of his 
interlocutors. Likewise, Mol narrowly escaped being in the right place at the 
wrong time. As we have shown, his ideas and approaches were not entirely 
out of step with his contemporaries. However, his was grand abstraction of a 
hopeful sort, and it came after more than 15 years of cultural upheaval in 
North America. It appears that his early empirical work in New Zealand and 
Australia (1965, 1972) carried him forward when, otherwise, his unique 
theorising – taken to be a brand of functionalism – would have sunk amidst 
the turbulence of conflict theories and post-structuralism. Indeed, as Towler’s 
critique highlights, Mol’s perfunctory allusions to, and tenuous portrayals of, 
competing ideas clung like heavy barnacles to the ship that he so vigorously 
launched.  
What is more, at the time of Identity and the Sacred’s publication reviewers 
seldom withheld their disdain for neo-functionalism. Indebted to Merton and 
Parsons, and steeped in the classic thought of Weber and Durkheim, Mol was 
at home with basic presuppositions such as humanity’s innate drive for order 
and religion’s presumed usefulness in providing an interpretation of reality 
with the potential to ameliorate the disorder lurking in the shadows of society. 
It should occasion little surprise, then, that Mol was sometimes sharply 
rebuked for ignoring religion’s potentially disruptive effects, a response 
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typically followed by accusations of functionalism. Theodore Long, for 
example, expressed his discontent both with Mol’s definition of religion and 
with his focus on its function: ‘For him, the ‘sacralisation of identity’ is both 
the defining characteristic of religion and the social function by which it is 
explained. In this elision of conceptualisation and explanation, common in 
functional analysis, the conceptualisation of religion is neglected...[and] leaves 
him with no analytic guidance in defining the focus of his empirical analysis... 
By limiting the potential social relevance of religion to integration, it excludes 
by theoretical fiat a whole range of empirical questions regarding religion’s 
disintegrative consequences’ (original emphasis) (Long, 1977: 422). 
These statements follow his earlier assessment: ‘Functionalism is the 
obvious villain of the piece, for Mol’s theory is little more than an elaboration 
of the basic functionalist explanation of religion’ (original emphasis) (Long, 
1977: 421). Even so, Long is willing to praise Mol’s work as ‘perhaps the most 
impressive’ of the books seeking to emphasise the ‘vitality and importance of 
religion in secular society’ due to its successful blend of ‘broad historical and 
comparative analysis with an elaboration of a general theoretical basis for such 
interpretations’ (Long, 1977: 421). 
Other reviewers echoed Long in articulating somewhat contradictory 
judgments of Mol’s work, countering their own contempt for functionalist 
interpretation with laudatory acknowledgments of identity theory’s immense 
conceptual structure and sweeping implications. For example, Richard Fenn 
begins with the simple claim that ‘Mol considers religion in functionalist 
terms’ but ends by noting Mol’s ‘impressive imagination and scope’ (1978: 67-
68). At other times, however, Mol’s peers seemed to offer more unequivocal 
appraisals. Kollar’s aforementioned criticism of Mol’s concern for the 
individual over and above the community, for instance, is paired with the 
basic assertion that Mol ‘sees religion in functionalist terms’ (1979: 332). A 
more assenting evaluation comes from Coleman who seems to connect the 
positive attributes of identity theory to its functionalist bent: ‘...the book is a 
rich lode of insight and would repay a careful reading. It contains one of the 
strongest functionalist treatments of religion available’ (1978: 570).  
Thus, Mol’s various critics and reviewers seemed to speak univocally of 
his functionalist analysis of religion. Despite his good company and the sizable 
empirical work conducted early in his career and undergirding the later 
theoretical contributions, the easy assessment saw Mol as having diverged very 
little from his teachers’ notions of the integrative role of religion in modern 
society. Although his dialectical framework included chaos and conflict, he 
seemed to determine his own fate by insisting that stable identity was both 
opposed to disorder and buttressed by religious commitment. Social scientists 
and scholars of religion in the mid-20th century drew from a relatively limited 
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pool of labels, however. In an intellectual milieu largely comprised of 
functionalists, structuralists, conflict theorists, and an inchoate ‘postmodern’ 
cohort, Mol was understandably associated with the first ‘school’. Well into 
the 21st century, though, we are now capable of a more complete sketch of the 
trajectories of those theoretical paradigms. Mol melded individual identity and 
non-rational emotional commitment, the collective legitimation of religious 
myth and the inevitability of social disruption. Furthermore, by positing a 
social theory of religion in which religion was a process rather than a static 
cultural object, he sidestepped the potential traps of both substantive and 
functional definition; religion theoretically referred to an incessant action 
which was both individually meaningful and collectively-legitimated. This 
notion of religion not only left room for the presence of conflicting identities 
(some sacralised and some not, for example) but also implied that religiosity 
could be located outside of traditional institutions. This suggestion led Mol to 
reject the secularisation thesis in the midst of its heyday and to deflect the 
sociological labels hurled at him. 
Whilst his incredulity regarding secularisation and synthesis of biology, 
philosophy, and social science may have been disregarded at the time, 
intellectual history now suggests that such ideas and approaches were 
antecedents to (perhaps portents of) concepts like desecularisation and 
scholarly aims like interdisciplinarity. In the end, of course, the novelty and 
utility of Mol’s ideas are measured by the guild. Social scientists and others 
who set their analytical sights on religious phenomena and the position of 
religion in our world will determine the proper, practical place of identity 
theory. In the previous pages, however, we have attempted to problematise 
the facile categorisation of Mol’s work as mid-20th-century ‘functionalism’, 
implicitly questioning whether such a conclusion resulted more from careful 
scrutiny or from potentially fallacious reasoning in which any notion of 
religion as a beneficial system was dismissed as naive and antiquated. 
Highlighting similarities between Mol’s publications from the 1970s and other 
distinctive theorists was a major component of our argument, indicating that 
hindsight situates his theory of religious identity alongside other enigmatic 
social-scientific figures – if not in a category all its own. 
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